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1 The  interlinked  phenomena  of  regionalism  and  interregionalism  are  both  essential
aspects  of  the  current  debate  about  the  evolution  of  multilateral  cooperation  in  a
context  of  cultural  diversity.  How  might  multilateral  cooperation  survive  in  a
multipolar world characterized by fragmentation, increasing cultural diversity between
and  within  regions  and  assertive  power  politics?  Are  regional  and  interregional
arrangements part of the global governance problem or perhaps part of the solution in
pioneering new forms of multilateral convergence? 
2 We start by remembering basic definitions, essential for a research agenda which is, by
essence,  multidisciplinary.  As  a  prolepsis,  for  a  geographical  journal,  we  define
multidisciplinarity  as  radically  different  from  interdisciplinarity:  while  the  second
methodology’s ambition is to merge various disciplinary methods and fundamentals,
with the aim of building-up a radically new transdisciplinary conceptualization, more
modestly multidisciplinarity aims at a limited convergence, among diverse disciplinary
research agendas, which remain diverse: a convergence driven by the shared interest
for a research object. The object in the case of this journal issue is firstly, “regionalism”
as  institutionalized  cooperation  among  neighboring  states;  secondly,
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“interregionalism” as cooperation between regions or entities belonging to different
continents. 
3 As a preliminary clarification we also remember a trivial empirical distinction. So as
many  concepts,  regionalism  has  two  complementary  meanings:  either  subnational
entities (Paasi, Harrison, Jones, 2018) or supranational groupings of neighboring states.
They share the gradual loss of centrality of the states within an increasingly multilevel
global  governance.  This  essay is  focusing on the second meaning,  defined by some
scholars:  macro-regions. Furthermore, while “regionalism” is about relations among
neighboring countries belonging to the same continent (Hettne et  al., 2001;  Hurrell,
Fawcett,  1995;  Gamble, Paine,  1996;  Telò,  2001),  “interregionalism” bridges different
entities belonging to two or three continents (Rühland, 2005; Söderbaum et  al., 2016;
Fawcett, Telò, Ponjaert, 2015). Students of comparative politics of geography, history
and economics are exploring similarities and differences, achievements and failures of
regional cooperation models. 
4 Regional organization is a structural feature of global governance since many decades.
In the new context  of  power shifts  and enhanced multipolar  confrontation,  are we
witnessing a crisis, an ambiguous evolution, or a dramatic reappraisal of some regional
cooperation projects as milestones along more competitive and instrumental paths?
And,  how  might  regional  cooperation  among  neighboring  states  and  interregional
dialogues or trade arrangements between geographically distant partners contribute to
a new post-hegemonic multilateralism?
5 Interregionalism  inevitably  concerns  intercontinental  relationships  among  diverse
models  and cultures of  modernity.  Should we regard the contours emerging in the
post-hegemonic era as a shift  towards an intercultural  clash between irreconcilable
regions  (Huntington,  1996),  or  as  the  potential  start  of  a  new  multidimensional
dialogue between diverse partners (Acharya, 2014; Qin, 2018)? New challenges, such as
populist nationalism, could seriously undermine both regional and multilateral forms
of cooperation. The traditional global order is contested both inside and outside the
states.  How  should  multidisciplinary  research  respond  to  the  need  for  a  new
multilateralist research agenda?
 
Convergences and divergences in national debates
about the coming world order
6 One major, and highly controversial, line of inquiry sheds light on the evolving global
power  framework.  Beyond  the  well-publicized  divergent  viewpoints  articulated  by
Fukuyama (1992)  and Huntington (1996)  in  the  aftermath of  the  Cold  War,  various
theses have been argued about the decline of  the global  American order (Keohane,
2015; Acharya, 2014; Kupchan, 2012). Haass (2008) has argued that the world is moving
towards a fragmented, a-polar world as US power recedes. By contrast, Ikenberry and
Deudney  (2018)  remain  convinced  that  global  institutions  are  robust  and  resilient
enough to cope with these historic challenges. 
7 Turning  to  the  EU,  the  dilemmas  of  continental  Europe  are  expressions  of  the
conflictual co-existence of two logics. On the one hand, we have the EU’s institutional
paradigm  of  reconciliation  among  erstwhile  enemies,  designed  to  put  an  end  to
“security dilemmas.” On the other we are witnessing the recent neo-nationalist trend.
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8 On a de facto basis, these debates converge drawing two alternative scenarios for the
future. The world is headed either toward hard power politics, based on a multipolar or
bipolar confrontation, or toward a heterogeneous system that features new forms of
multilateral cooperation. Logically, only the latter paradigm is potentially respectful of
the “constraining diversities”  that  characterize  our current  situation.  And only the
latter offers other global actors – such as the EU, India, Japan, Indonesia, Australia,
Canada,  the  African Union,  ASEAN,  and MERCOSUR –  a  potentially  relevant  role  in
regional, interregional, and global governance. Of course regional entities should be
comparatively verified as their main trends of development: are they closed fortresses
or are they open venue for interregional multipurpose partnerships?
 
Conceptualizing and comparing interregionalist
partnerships as a test for intercultural dialogue 
9 Interregional relations are understudied even though they are crucial in modifying the
debate  about  the  global  order  and  the  development  of  regional  entities.  The  first
conceptual debate about the role of interregional relations started in the 1990s, under
the auspices of the “Rio process” between the EU and Latin America. The ASEM (Asia-
Europe meeting), which celebrated its 12th summit in Ulaanbaatar on October 18, 2018,
was launched in Bangkok in 1996. Many scholars also would include the former ACP,
started  in  1973  via  the  Yaoundé  Convention,  in  the  same  conceptual  framework
because the EU’s partners in that organization were located in other parts of the world:
namely, Africa, Oceania, and Caribbean. Multiple conceptual controversies emerged in
the academic world around the turn of the new century. At that time, it became clear
that in the 1990s, the US had developed its own interregional relationships, based on
Fred Bergsten’s  theory of  “emerging markets” (Bergsten,  1994).  These included ties
with Latin America (the FTAA, formed in 1994, which failed in 2005); with Asia and the
Pacific (APEC, formed in 1994); and with Europe (the new Transatlantic Agenda of the
1990s).  For its  part,  the EU – in the context of  its  new ambitions as  global  actor –
negotiated almost a dozen parallel “Strategic partnerships” (with China in 2003, India
in 2004, Brazil in 2007, and many more later on) and several trade arrangements with
individual  countries  or  with  a  group  of  countries.  These  initiatives  raised  some
important  theoretical  issues:  e.g.,  whether  in  a  de   facto sense  such  Strategic
partnerships (as well as some EPA –“European partnership agreement” – with single
African countries) were opposed to region-to-region partnerships, and/or to bloc-to-
bloc relations (Santander, 2016).
10 However,  the  majority  of  the  epistemic  community  shares  a  flexible  and
comprehensive  concept  of  interregional  relations  which  could  be  summarized  as
follows: “multidimensional relations between one region, on the one hand, and a region
or a large state on the other, belonging to two or three different continents.” By this
definition,  the  EU-China  partnership,  BRI,  TTIP,  CETA and TPP,  all  would  count  as
interregional relations. To characterize this second type of interregional relations with
greater precision, the concept of “hybrid interregionalism“ has been proposed and now
is shared by several scholars (Rühland, 2015; Soederbaum et  al.,  2016; Fawcett et  al.,
2015).
11 The main point  to  be  brought  out  here  is  that  a  regional  organization may play a
decisive  role  as  at  least  one  of  the  partners  within  a  scheme  of  interregional
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cooperation.  In  this  respect,  we  are  witnessing  a  multiplication  of  interregional
relations, such as those launched by ASEAN, MERCOSUR, and the African Union.
12 By  this  encompassing  definition  it  is  possible  to  assert  that,  like  regionalism,
interregionalism is a structural feature of an increasingly multilayered system of global
governance in which the global multilateral set is no longer the sole framework for
institutionalized cooperation. As a significant development of the UN Charter of 1945,
the balance between the regional/ interregional level  of  governance and the global
level  is  shifting in favor of the former.  Both Boutros Boutros-Ghali  and Kofi  Annan
recognized, on behalf of the UN, the increasing relevance of the sub-global (notably the
regional)  dimension  of  governance  in  helping  to  prevent  or  manage  conflicts  and
establish economic cooperation. The fact that two UN Secretary-Generals saw the value
of regionalism itself has had an impact, helping to sustain regional organizations and
foster regional identities.
13 But  there  is  another,  less  positive  take  on  this  trend.  Globalist  economic  liberals,
reflecting on the place of such ties within the system of global governance (Bhagwati,
1992),  likely  might  see both regionalism and interregionalism as  a  symptom of  the
fragmentation  of  the  global  framework.  Yet  undoubtedly,  regional  cooperation
eventually  encourages  interregional  ties,  trade  partnerships,  and  sometimes  even
cultural  dialogues.  Thus,  the  normative  criticisms that  leveled  by  Bhagwati  against
regional and interregional trade arrangements are outdated, but his remarks suggest a
different and stimulating observation. Regional and interregional arrangements may
be driven by factors other than trade interests.  As scholars of  the new regionalism
assert, the explosion of these phenomena can be analyzed comparatively as a trend
towards a “world of regions” (Katzenstein, 2005), a longue durée and structural process
of multilayered transformation of global governance (Fawcett, Hurrell, 1995; Hettne et
al.,  2001;  Hettne,  2008;  Telò,  2001,  2016;  Risse,  Boerzel,  2016;  Gamble,  Paine  1996).
Normative condemnations in the name of economic neo-liberalism seem inappropriate
for  a  multidisciplinary  research  agenda.  Regions  develop  their  own  identities  and
interregional  relations,  including  by  trade  arrangements.  Such  regional  and
interregional  relationships  are  no  longer  a  matter  of  mere  rational  choice  alone;
instead, they reflect political decisions, as well as shared values, standards, perceptions,
and ways of life.
14 All in all, the development of multipurpose regionalism and interregionalism also can
be  seen  as  the  only  way  possible  to  revive  and  reform  global  multilateralism,  by
enhancing not only its efficiency but also its legitimacy, because regional governance
often plays the role of a bottom-up support of global governance. In this way, the new
regionalism  goes  beyond  the  limits  of  the  famous  debate  between  Bhagwati  and
Summers in the early 90s, which was limited to trade dimensions (see Morin et al., 2015;
De Block, Lebullinger, 2018).
15 In terms of its theoretical implications, interregionalism is a form of multidimensional
cooperation that may include cultural  identities and feelings of common belonging,
which  together  may  help  to  ward  off,  or  at  least  to  limit,  anarchy,  nationalism,
competition, ethnocentrism, protectionism, and fragmentation.
16 Interregionalism  belongs  to  the  realm  of  new  complex  institutional  sets  and
frameworks of complex interdependence, operating within a highly contested scheme
of global governance. In these ways, it transcends the old realist thought, even if the
latter appears to have made a comeback, being revived by the nationalist challenge
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posed by extreme right nationalism (“populist realism” according to Qin 2018) in many
countries. 
 
Diachronic dimensions of EU’s interregionalism from
the 1990s to the present
17 A second relevant debate within the international epistemic community has concerned
the evolution of interregional relations in the aftermath of the Cold War and its impact
on regional  cooperation.  During the first  decade,  which Andrew Gamble  (2014)  has
termed  the  era  of  “liberal  peace,”  the  Clinton/  Bergsten  approach  to  regional
cooperation was essentially economic and instrumental, focusing on free trade areas in
the  three  directions  mentioned  above;  that  approach  was  expected  to  revive  a
hegemonic  style:  hegemonic  in  the  sense  meant  by  Keohane  (1984).  The  Clinton/
Bergsten approach would dispute the hegemonic decline of the United States, which
began in 1971, with the end of the Gold standard based on the US dollar. Nevertheless,
that approach was consistent with the so-called IMF “Washington Consensus” (1989)
and Western neoliberal culture. In the three cases – APEC, FTAA, and New Transatlantic
Agenda  –  it  sparked  bitter  conflicts  with  deeper  regional  organizations  such  as
MERCOSUR  in  South  America,  ASEAN  in  the  Asia-Pacific  zone,  and  the  EU  in  the
transatlantic area. These three examples of regional cooperation encompassed political
and  cultural  implications  as  well,  which  were  incompatible  with  the  USA’s  neo-
hegemonic and rational-choice approach to international relations.
18 The effort by George W. Bush to subordinate interregional agendas to security concerns
after  2001  –  the  era  of  “liberal  war,”  according  to  Gamble  (2014)  –  sharpened  the
resistance  of  the  various  partners  to  US-led interregional  projects.  As  a  result,  the
interregional  projects  of  the  US largely  went  nowhere.  This  debacle  confirmed the
failure  of  earlier  attempts  by  Clinton  and  by  G.H.W.  Bush  to  revive  the  declining
hegemonic, US-led multilateralism by relying on interregional arrangements, whether
focused on free trade or security. Such interregional setbacks were paralleled by the
shortcomings of the WTO-DDR from Seattle (2000) to Cancun (2003) and the failure of
the “liberal wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the same period, the Southeast Asian
economic crisis provoked a regionalist reaction against the IMF and the Washington
Consensus while fostered the deepening of the ASEAN integration process. The latter
began expanding into monetary, political, and cultural fields. For example, the “Chang
Mai Initiative” for a regional fund that began in 2000 was supported by ASEAN, China,
Japan, and South Korea as a critical step towards IMF rules.
19 Academics at this time, at least in the field of international relations, still focused on
comparing  the  competing  US-led  and  EU-led  interregional  endeavors.  Two  main
differences between the approaches of the EU and USA, as underlined by prominent
scholars like Hettne (2007), stood out. First, while the EU’s interregional relations were
multipurpose  (economic,  cultural,  environmental,  social,  and  political),  US-led
arrangements were either only free trade-oriented or security-oriented with G.W.Bush
(e.g., in the realm of anti-terrorism). EU interregionalism included three baskets: socio/
cultural and environmental cooperation, economic cooperation, and political dialogue.
That approach could be considered an example of the politicization of interregional
partnerships  in  defense of  multilateralism.  The condemnation of  the United States’
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preventive war in Iraqi by the EU-CELAC interregional meeting of 2003 in Guadalajara
suggests what such politicization might accomplish.
20 A second difference in this  regard is  that  interregional  relations started by the EU
typically  supported  multidimensional  regional  integration  abroad,  whereas  US-led
efforts were at cross-purposes with deeper regional integration. The EU approach made
it  possible not only to engage in various form of “diffusion” or regionalism abroad
(Risse,  2016),  while  not  always  avoiding  excessive  emulation  and  mimesis  and  the
arrogant normative emphasis on the “EU model” and “normative power” (Manners,
2002).
 
The emergence of competing regionalisms and
interregionalisms: convergences, failures, and power
relations
21 Since  2010,  the  international  scholarly  debate  on  global  governance  has  changed
dramatically due to the economic and financial crisis, the rapid emergence of China,
and the rise of the BRICS. An issue raised years ago by Hettne (2007) has gained saliency
in the present political  context:  do interregional relations facilitate the cohesion of
regional  partners  or  are  they  more  likely  to  divide  and  disintegrate  the  partner
organization  as  a  bloc?  Bloc-to-bloc  negotiations  (e.g.,  EU/ASEAN,  EU/AU  and  EU/
MERCOSUR) are an identity marker in which each partner has a direct mirror interest
in mutually supporting the other’s current and future internal integration. The EU’s
policy on cooperation with ASEAN for disaster relief  and security issues provides a
positive example (cf. GEM research project, notably that by Tercovich, 2019). In what
follows,  we  will  try  to  assess  whether  interregional  relations  spur  integration  or
division around the world. As will become apparent, the role and nature of the leading
partner –  whether that  be the US,  Russia,  China,  and the EU –  is  often decisive in
determining the answer.
22 Under the Trump administration, the US has been abandoning the enhanced global role
sought  by  Presidents  Clinton  and  Obama  through  mega-interregional  trade
arrangements.  The  turning  point  was  Trump’s  decision  to  delegitimize  the  global
multilateral  network (WTO and its  panels)  and to  dismantle  the Obama attempt to
revive US interregional hegemony though the TPP and TTIP. The only alternative to
those efforts that Trump accepts – aside from national protectionism and trade wars –
is  to  undertake  hierarchical  revisions  of  previous  regional  and  interregional
arrangements that allegedly will favor US interests, including in symbolic terms. For
example. NAFTA was simply rebaptized as USCMA in order to put the US first even in
the acronym while deleting the acronym FTA. We may define this sort of regionalism as
a  form  of  hierarchical  transactionalism  combining  two  bilateral  relationships, the
opposite of true multilateral regionalism. In the event that Trump should propose the
same for US relations with Japan, the UK, China, and the EU, heightened tensions may
occur. The partner matters, as well as its politics and/or vision of the best possible
combination of bilateralism, interregionalism, and multilateralism.
23 In this context it  is  notable that both the US under Trump and Russia under Putin
explicitly  seek  the  dismemberment  of  the  EU.  Putin  is  funding  extremist  anti-EU
nationalist far right wing parties in order to weaken and divide the Union. For his part,
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Trump famously proposed Brexit to EU member states as a model and described even
NATO  as  “obsolete”,  throwing  the  organization  into  a  crisis  that  may  presage  its
decline.  These  policies  imperil  transatlantic  interregionalism,  much  as  the  US
withdrawal  from  the  Trans-Pacific  Partnership  agreement  vitiated  prospects  for
enhanced transpacific cooperation including the US.
24 Particularly relevant for the future of pan-European, East/West interregional relations
is the way that Putin’s hard policies toward Georgia and Ukraine have transformed the
potentially complementary EU and Eurasian Economic Union constructs (EAEU) into
strategically competing projects. Under this new scenario, defections from the Eurasian
Community  in  favor  of  pro-EU  arrangements  may  be  either  punished  by  military
invasion, as has occurred in eastern Ukraine, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, or subjected
to blackmail by the withholding of energy supplies, as happened to Armenia. To be
sure, Russia’s conduct was motivated by what it perceived to be the threat in its own
backyard posed by NATO’s eastward expansion after 1991. Still, that conduct, which led
to the EU’s unanimous sanctions against Russia, indicate the dangerous collapse of the
peaceful  Pan-European  interregional  architecture  established  after  1990-91,  as
embodied  in  the  Council  of  Europe,  OSCE,  Russia-NATO  Council,  and  strategic
partnership between the EU and Russia.
25 Authoritarian  regimes  like  Putin’s  Russia  sometimes  work  to  foster  regional  and
interregional cooperation. Typically, they do so for geopolitical defensive advantages,
or when they think that such moves will  promote autocracy in their neighborhood
and/or a “hard” version of multipolarity. However, as far as Putin’s vision and practice
of regional cooperation is concerned, the absence of democracy, bottom-up drivers,
and civil society actors all are factors limiting regional cooperation and shaping it an
unprecedented  way.  Furthermore,  one  must  consider  the  internal  mechanisms
enabling or constraining relations between autocrats leading member states. In this
context, security is the main engine of regime-building. Because of its internal rules
and  procedures,  this  top-down,  hierarchical  version  of  regionalism  cannot  be
multilateral  and  scholars  do  underline  the  substantial  diversity  from  new regional
democratic regionalism.
26 Notwithstanding these limits, it is very interesting that today large states, including
Russia, want to coordinate policies at the regional level, thus moving – to some extent –
beyond the old imperial  concept  of  spheres of  influence that  prevailed in the 19th
century.  Regional  and interregional  relations  may matter  by  shaping  the  future  of
regional  entities  characterized  by  alternative  values,  features  and  identities  in
competing directions. So, on the one hand, the EU potentially could influence parts of
the Eurasian community, such as Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, the Caucasus. On the other
hand,  China’s  regional  policy  in  central  Asia,  notably  the  Shanghai  Cooperation
Organization (with its “Chinese characteristics”), may be critical as the future evolution
of the EAEU is concerned. 
27 As far as the EU is concerned, the quasi-continental enlargement policy, reflected in
that body’s growth from 12 to 27 member states plus 5 applicants, is widely regarded as
a success-story. By contrast, the EU’s attempt to establish interregional relationships
with the “arc of  crisis” countries,  from Ukraine and Belarus to Libya and the Arab
nations  –  exemplified  in  the  “Barcelona  process”  and  the  European  neighborhood
policy – largely can be judged a quasi-failure, at least so far, and a challenge awaiting
future resolution. Cultural cleavages do affect this failure, not only on the southern
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flank (cf.  the poor record of the EU’s multiple attempts at  a cultural  dialogue with
Islam),  but  also on the eastern flank,  as  shown by the oscillating relationship with
Moldova, the Caucasus states, and Belarus, and the deadlock in educational and cultural
cooperation  with  Russia.  The  latter  shows  up  in  the  frozen  bilateral  strategic
partnerships  between  the  EU  and  Russia  as  well  in  both the  Council  of  Europe
(regarding the crucial dimension of human rights protection) and OSCE (regarding the
monitoring of democratic transitions).
28 Comparative studies offer evidence of the authoritarian evolution of top-down regional
cooperation organizations also elsewhere, notably in the cases of the Gulf Cooperation
Council. The latter has been described as an instrument of Saudi Arabia’s hierarchical
rule, exemplified by its campaign against Qatar, which has been accused of complicity
with Iran. Another case of such authoritarian evolution is ALBA, a political instrument
of the declining Venezuela influencing poorer countries. Authoritarian regionalism is
an alternative model of regional cooperation, distinct from soft/relational and deep/
institutionalized  regionalism,  which  are  both  based  on  bottom-up  legitimacy  and
multilateral rules.  The latter models would include the multipurpose entities of EU,
ASEAN,  MERCOSUR,  and  SADC,  no  matter  what  the  main  driving  factors  (security,
trade, or institutions) behind them may have been.
29 China’s interregional relations in the Xi era (and the “post-peaceful rising period”) that
was openly proclaimed by the 19th CCP Congress are instructive. The Belt and Road
Initiative  (BRI)  exemplifies  a  unilateral  interregional  global  project  of  staggering
magnitude. Are China’s interregional policies in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America
evolving  towards  a  multilateral  or  hierarchical  pattern,  and  are  they  uniting  or
dividing the various regional/continental partners? In regard to China’s relations to
Europe,  we  are  witnessing  a  paradox.  For  many  decades  the  consensus  among
international observers was that China strongly supported the unity of the EU as well
as further integration, with the purpose of counterbalancing the power of the US and
the USSR/Russia. However, it has become apparent that China is currently making a
twofold European policy, notably by the 17+1 arrangement with central and eastern
European countries. The attempt to reach out to Europe, manifested most recently in Xi
Jinping’s 2018 and 2019 visits to Brussels, has deep roots in Chinese history, extending
not only back to Deng Xiaoping but even to Mao Zedong’s vision of a multipolar world
and  a  politically  united  Europe’s  balancing  role  both  in  trans-Atlantic  and  Pan-
European  relations.  Moreover,  Xi’s  support  for  the  EU  runs  parallel  to  China’s
controversial political and financial support for the African Union. China has offered to
build  the  AU’s  headquarters  in  Addis  Ababa  and  promised  to  upgrade  Chinese
investments within the AU. However, as part of its BRI, China is now institutionalizing
its relationships with 17 European states. In a de facto sense, China is thus dividing the
EU, much to the dismay of those in charge of the European Union’s institutions.
30 The shift  in China’s  European policy is  part  of  a  broader set  sea change.  In the Xi
Jinping era, China has increased its assertiveness as a global actor. It is in the process of
developing its own practices, characteristics, and ideas of global multilateralism and
regionalism, both in its own neighborhood and in interregional relations with Africa
and Europe (via the BRI) as well as Latin America. The China-Africa partnership has
developed enormously since 2010, and these interregional economic ties are supported
by political  objectives.  Most  analyses  of  China's  offensive  diplomacy in  Africa  have
focused on Beijing's thirst for economic benefits in regard to energy and raw materials.
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That is why its behavior often is dubbed “energy diplomacy” or “economic diplomacy”,
implying that China, like Japan in the 1980s, seeks to become a “geo-economic power”.
But if one looks at the history of the PRC's foreign policy, one realizes that Beijing has
seldom  pursued  its  diplomacy  based  on  purely  economic  considerations.  Chinese
interregionalism in Africa should be viewed through a political lens, in light of geo-
strategic calculations, political and security ties with African countries, peacekeeping
and  anti-piracy  efforts,  and  support  for  African  regionalism.  China's  diplomatic
expansion in Africa, while partially driven by its need for economic growth, cannot be
fully understood  without  taking  into  consideration  the  strategic  impulses
accompanying  its  accelerating  emergence  as  a  global  power.  Africa’s  interregional
partnership  is  one  of  China's  diplomatic  “new  frontiers”,  as  exemplified  by  new
Chinese leader Xi Jinping's maiden foreign trip to Africa in 2013 and in following years.
That is why the huge FDI plan for Africa has been interpreted by some international
commentators as an excellent opportunity, but also as posing a risk of division and
geopolitical domination.
31 In short, recent events are obliging neutral observers to address the question of the
nature of  China’s  interregionalism by typing in a  question mark.  The deepening of
relations between China, on the one hand, and 17 E.U. and non-EU Eastern European
states, and the bilateral arrangements made with Portugal and Italy in 2019, on the
other, is weakening the institutional role of the EU central institutions as the main
coordinator of Europe’s external cooperation, trade, and partnerships. They are also de
facto strengthening Euro-skeptical governments such as those of Orbán in Hungary,
Kaczynski  in  Poland,  and  Conte/Salvini  in  Italy  (2018-2019).  In  the  context  of  the
economic decline of southern EU member states after the financial crisis 2009-17, it is
also  worthy of  mention that  China’s  decision to  prioritize  individual  relations with
single EU countries, notably with the weakest like Greece, provokes worries regarding
its political designs.
32 It would be blind to deny that the Belt and Road Initiative presents an interregional
opportunity of historic importance for all, including Africa, Asia, Latin America, and
the EU. Presented by Xi Jinping as the “project of the century,” it is one of the pillars of
the  “Third  Chinese  Revolution”  (after  those  spearheaded  by  Mao  and  Deng:  cf.
Economy, 2018), beyond the period of the so-called “peaceful rise.” It will be a crucial
test for China’s interregionalism and multilateralism. 
33 The USA opposes the BRI as a major rival to its own global influence and a risky bargain
for  weak  states.  Does  the  launch  of  the  BRI  presage  a  neo-hegemonic  shift?  If  its
implementation  openly  serves  the  geopolitical  interests  of  a  single  great  power,
thereby  promoting  a  one-sided  understanding  of  globalization,  it  will  provoke
resistance, criticism, and containment. Comparisons with the American Marshall Plan
of  1947-57  may  be  useful.  The  Marshall  Plan’s  inspiration  was  innovative  and
enlightened Keynesianism. John Maynard Keynes believed that the shortcomings of the
Versailles  conference  in  1919  stemmed  from  (among  other  things)  a  flawed
understanding of  international  economic relations that  he had tried (and failed)  to
correct. He ended up “winning” at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, converging
with the Roosevelt brain trust on the idea that the new postwar economic order must
be based on multilateral agreements. However, largely due to Stalin’s opposition, the
Marshall Plan by 1947 had become de facto also an instrument of the Cold War and the
containment  policy  developed -  under  George  Kennan advice-.  In  combination,  the
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Marshall  Plan  and  the  policy  of  containment  became  the  twin  linchpins  of  US
hegemony (Keohane, 1984, 2004; Ruggie, 1993; Patrick, 2009). That hegemony involved
providing  international  public  goods,  promoting  the  European  Organization  for
Economic  Cooperation  as  a  new  multilateral  institution,  and  applying  the  logic  of
power politics to the bipolar confrontation between the US and the USSR. Especially in
the  wake  of  Stalin’s  1948  refusal  to  allow  the  participation  of  Czechoslovakia  and
Yugoslavia in the Marshall Plan, it became effectively impossible for US aid recipients
to reject demands to join NATO.
34 We are not (not yet) in an era of bipolar confrontation, and there is no “Thucydides
trap” between China and the West lurking around the corner (Allison, 2017). But what
still remains inspiring in this troubled time for a true hegemonic project is that the
multilateral approach taken by the US after World War II managed to survive the Cold
War, thanks to both its links to global economic growth and the attractiveness of the
“American way of life” as a form of soft power. Assuming that China is not seeking to
use the BRI to pursue international hegemony, it will need to expand the nature of its
international public goods provision, offer its autonomous partners opportunities for
economic growth, enhance its soft power dimension, and foster shared interregional
leadership  within  a  revived  multilateral  network  in  order  to  limit  the  impact  of
negative feedback and foil  policies of containment by the US and other actors.  The
quality of its partnership with the EU and possible convergences both at the global and
interregional levels are crucial.  These are the key variables that may influence this
potentially  virtuous  interregional  scenario.  Here,  a  triangular  partnership among
China, the EU, and Africa would be a relevant test.
35 The most daunting challenge facing a pluralist, multiple-style multilateralism is how to
combine trade with other interregional issues,  thereby linking external relations to
internal policies. Traditionally, trade was a matter of technocratic, de-politicized global
or interregional relations. However, this is changing dramatically, as a comparison of
Chinese and EU approaches to foreign policy makes clear. Whereas the accent in China
is on “multilateralism with Chinese characteristics” (19th CCP Congress, 2017), the EU
strives to embody its own values in the making of foreign policy. In other words, the
EU’s  cultural  traditions  extend  even  to  its  trade  policy.  Of  course,  future  post-
hegemonic multilateralism will have to be based on pluralist convergence among very
diverse  approaches,  political  styles,  background  cultures,  and  divergent  ways  of
making  policy.  Ignoring  this  principle  slowed  progress  in  expanding  multilateral
trading  relations.  No  country  wants  to  buy  another’s values  in  unilateral  way,  in
addition to its commercial  products.  When interregional dialogue misses a two-way
exchange, a negative feed-back is to be expected by the junior partner.
36 In  the  aftermath  of  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon,  which  went  into  effect  in  2009,  the  EU
attempted to create a comprehensive approach to foreign policy and a kind of single
pillar of external relations. Legally framed by the Treaty of the EU (TEU) and the Treaty
on  the  Functioning  of  the  EU  (TFEU),  that  approach  obliges  EU  policymakers  to
promote human rights and sustainable development, among other general aims. EU
Trade  Commissioner  Cecelia  Malmstrom’s  2015  paper,  entitled  “Trade  for  All,”
emphasized that “economic growth goes hand in hand with social justice, respect for
human  rights,  high  labor  and  environmental  standards,  and  health  and  safety
protection” (2015, p. 10). Finally, the “EU Global strategy” approved in 2016, following a
proposal by the High Representative for Foreign Policy Federica Mogherini, commits
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the EU to “harmonizing trade arrangements not only with development goals but also
with sustainable development, environmental protection, health, safety, human rights
protection and foreign policy strategy”. 
37 This approach is counterbalanced and framed by a strong emphasis on regional and
interregional partnerships, in which the EU does not have to provide lessons to the
partners.  The  previous  Eurocentric  and  arrogant  perspective  of  “normative  power
Europe” (Manners,  2002) looks as definitely over,  and not only because it  provoked
negative  feedback  on  every  continent,  as  Acharya  (2014)  and  other  scholars  have
underlined.
38 What can be said about the impact of this controversial evolution? Are these ambitious
objectives realistic? Between 2010 and 2018, the EU negotiated and signed a series of
relevant  “second  generation  trade  arrangements”  with  interregional  partners  like
South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Canada, MERCOSUR (De Block, Lebullinger, 2018). Similar
arrangements are under negotiation with Australia,  ASEAN and New Zealand. These
complex and multipurpose interregional partnerships are politically relevant, notably
in  the  Asia-Pacific  region,  because  they  address  the  huge  vacuum  created  by  the
inward-looking  and  protectionist  policy  of  Donald  Trump.  Although  arrangements
about foreign investments were located in the sphere of EU competence by the Lisbon
Treaty, this competence was fine-tuned by the European Court of Justice in 2019. For
that  reason,  the  difficulties  involving  several  ongoing  negotiations,  including  the
Bilateral Investment Treaty with China, are understandable. Is China likely to agree to
seek some relevant improvements in respect for the rule of law in general and labor
law  in  particular?  Transparency  and  fairness  in  business  are  the  conditions  for
attracting  foreign  investments,  increasing  trade,  building  financial  and  economic
partnerships.  Consequently,  they  are  among  the  goals  of  President  Xi  Jinping,  as
announced at the party congress of 2018. However, many problems exist that touch on
the domestic impact of multilateral standards. For example, divergences in the notions
of the rule of law and human rights have not yet been successfully addressed by the EU-
China “human rights dialogue” (Ding et  al.,  2017). In addition, the question of labor
rights is affecting the BIT agenda. 
39 Could the EU simply forget about complying with its demanding treaty and strategy
provisions? Doing so would not be easy, first because of the Lisbon Treaty provision
that has altered the process through which trade policy acquires legitimacy. The treaty
calls  for  enhanced  democratic  accountability  and  transparency  by  bestowing  an
oversight  role  on  the  EU  parliament.  Moreover,  that  body  has  the  final  word  on
ratification and carries on a constant dialogue with very persistent NGOs. The Lisbon
Treaty thus has changed the parameters and now requires closer cooperation among
the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament. In effect, it integrates the Parliament
into the established decision-making system. Furthermore, after the declaration by the
Commission that some trade and investment arrangements such as CETA are “mixed
treaties” that require the signatures of and ratification by both the EU and the member
states,  some  of  the  latter  have  accepted  and  even  supported  the  bottom-up
politicization of EU trade policy. They have chosen to submit treaties to national and
even sub-national (in the case of Belgium) majority decision-making. Legitimacy is very
relevant a true priority. However, according to many observers, that complex internal
ratification procedure may undermine the credibility of the EU in international and
interregional negotiations.
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40 Is this more rigorous process on the part of the EU a sign of unilateral arrogance that
will make beneficial trade deals harder to negotiate and less effective once they are? Or
should the new system be considered, if not an example to be followed by partners, a
constructive factor, fostering higher standards in commercial arrangements, as it did
in several instances, notably in the cases of Canada, Mexico, MERCOSUR, Japan, and
Asia-Pacific? It is too early to answer this crucial comparative research question.
 
Conclusions
41 Both regional cooperation and interregional multipurpose partnerships are extremely
significant  in  many  fields  of  global  governance,  including  trade,  economics,
environment  and  politics.  However,  in  a  context  of  increasing  competition  with
alternative  authoritarian  models,  the  bottom-up,  democratic  and  multilateral  type
cannot progress without a substantial political upgrading, and without seriously while
gradually  addressing  the  respective  background  cultures  and  their profound
differences. To cite just one case in which the background culture has an enormous
impact on politics, we spent a part of this essay in considering the case of EU relations
with China. There, the legacy of the Confucian background is not merely rhetorical; it is
one  of  the  country’s  main  strong  points. Despite  their  internal  debates,  eminent
Chinese scholars do agree on this, including Qin (2008), Yan (2011) and Zhao (2016), all
of whom have argued eloquently for the continuing relevance of Confucianism in China
(see for example the April 2018 conference at CFAU University, Beijing) for the current
approaches  to  international  and  interregional  relations.  Turning  to  the  European
Union,  we  would  encounter  broad  agreement  that,  at  least  on  the  continent  and
excluding the UK, the Enlightenment tradition and the value of peaceful reconciliation
between  previous  enemies  still  matter  a  great  deal  in  supporting  the  integration
process  and  open  interregional  relations.  Christian,  liberal  and  social  democratic
thought  constitute  some  of  the  building  blocks  of  the  shared  pluralist  European
background culture that supports peaceful, cooperative governance beyond the state
and between the states and regions (Telò, 2018). 
42 The  international  multidisciplinary  epistemic  community  should  look  for new,
creative,  pluralist  theories  of  global  governance  beyond the  state,  and identify  the
sources  of  thought  and  action  that  might  implement  such  governance  in  the
polymorphic international life of the 21st century. To what extent and under which
conditions  is  the  European  “background  knowledge”  compatible  with  intercultural
dialogue  and  “relational  multilateralism”?  Beyond  traditional  universalism  we  will
need  “differentiated  universalism”  as  a  bottom-up  way  to  overcome  the  risk  of
relativism  while  respecting  the  geographic  territorial  dimension.  These  should  be
topics for multidisciplinary research programs including political science, economics,
law,  philosophy,  history and geography.  In any case,  it  is  a  matter of  fact  that  the
territorial  and  transnational  dimension  of  the  world  polity  plays  a  crucial  role  in
sustaining  interregionalism  in  several ways,  notably  by  making  it  more  efficient,
legitimate, and able to frame balanced dialogue among cultures. Memory also matters:
thinkers such as Habermas (2001), and Bobbio (1999), among others, have made it clear
that this cathartic feature of European political culture marked a radical turning point
against centuries of tragic conflicts and wars provoked by extreme nationalism during
the first decades of the 20th century, the most violent period in European history. In
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the very moment at which movements have arisen that revive the pre-1945 nationalist
specter, it is important to underline this feature of the European political background
culture, one that is the very soul of European reconciliation and is open to intercultural
dialogue. Similar reconciliation processes are ongoing in South America and Southeast
Asia, while they are in deadlock or in stalemate in South Asia (India-Pakistan) Middle
East, and East Asia (China-Japan).
43 The  alternative  to  dialogue  and  reconciliation  between  geographical  neighbors  or
distant  partners  would  be  the  nightmare  of  a  cultural  and civilizational  regression
towards  extreme  nationalism,  perhaps  a  kind  of  Huntingtonian  clash  between
irreconcilable  regions  (Huntington  1996).  Peaceful  interregional  transnationalism
based on internal reconciliation is not the identity marker emerging from European
societies 75 years after 1945: it has lasted as a critical factor in promoting peace though
socio-economic integration and governance beyond the state. As a consequence of the
financial  crisis  that  began  in  2007-08,  nationalism  has  returned  in  the  form  of
populism,  protectionism,  and  intolerance.  It  poses  a  threat  not  only  to  domestic
democracy but also to interregional and multilateral cooperation. What is new is that
the populist rhetoric deploys democracy as a rhetorical weapon against three targets:
openness,  European  integration,  and  interregional  relations  with  other  continents,
notably with Africa, South America, East Asia and China.
44 The way of  interregional  dialogue even if  controversial  is  realistic  enough.  Partner
cultures exist in each continent as potential ideational constructive factors. We already
mentioned the potentials of the Confucian culture. In other continents, for example,
Pan-Africanists such as Henry Sylvester Williams, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and
Kofi Annan (Yusuf, 2014) and Pan-Americanists like Simón Bolívar added very much
concerning  the  synthesis  between  patriotism,  freedom,  regional  and  interregional
cooperation. This innovative way forward might lead to several confidence-building
processes,  trust-building dialogues, while gradually allowing governance beyond the
state  to  be  transformed  from  an  instrumental  into  a  binding  process  supporting
common struggles for common global goods. This gradual revision of the traditional
Westphalian  paradigm  towards  a  multilayered,  post-hegemonic  multilateral
governance is very controversial, but, to some extent, already underway.
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ABSTRACTS
This article draws the attention firstly on the diffusion of macro-regional organizations in each
continent as well as on the inter-regional relations. Secondly it places this intermediary levels of
governance - between states and global organizations - in the context of the big challenge of the
interpretation of the current global order change after 1991.
On the basis of a sophisticated conceptualization of both regionalism and inter-regionalism the
articles  addresses  the  impact  of  the  multipolar  power  structure  of  the  world,  on  regional
cooperation. Two alternative scenarios are forecasted as outcome of this comparative research:
either  an  instrumental  and  authoritarian  downgrading  of  regional  cooperation  as  influence
spheres of  great powers or the gradual emergence of  a new multilateralism, post-hegemonic
multilayered, more legitimate and more efficient.
Cet article attire en premier lieu l'attention sur la diffusion des organisations macro-régionales
dans chaque continent ainsi que sur les relations entre les régions. Deuxièmement il situe ce
phénomène intermédiaire entre les Etats et les organisations globales au sein du grand thème du
changement de l'ordre mondial après 1991.
Sur  la  base  d'un  côté  d'une  conceptualisation  du  régionalisme  et  de  l'autre  de  l'inter-
régionalisme, il aborde la question de savoir quelles conséquences la structure multipolaire de
l'ordre mondial produit sur les régions. Deux scenarii découlent de cette l'analyse comparée : une
dégradation instrumentale autoritaire du régionalisme dans les sphères d'influence des grandes
puissances  ou  l'émergence  graduelle  d'un  multilatéralisme  nouveau :  post-hégémonique,  à
plusieurs niveaux, plus légitime et efficace.
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Mots-clés: régionalisme, interrégionalisme, multilatéralisme, multipolarité, ordre mondial
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